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Emerging
Infections: What
Have We Learned
from SARS?
Given the current size and mobili-
ty of the human population, emerging
diseases pose a continuing threat to
global health. This threat became real-
ity with the outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS). The
emergence of a disease requires two
steps: introduction into the human
population and perpetuated transmis-
sion. Although preventing the intro-
duction of a new disease is ideal, con-
taining a zoonosis is a necessity. The
lessons that we have learned from
SARS were the topic of a meeting of
The Royal Society on January 13,
2004, in London, England.
Zoonoses are responsible for most
emerging infectious diseases, includ-
ing infections caused by Ebola virus,
West Nile virus, monkeypox, han-
tavirus, HIV, and new subtypes of
influenza A. In the case of SARS
coronavirus (SARS-CoV), serologic
evidence indicates that the virus was
spread through interspecies transmis-
sion from wild game markets in
Guangdong, China (Malik Peiris,
University of Hong Kong). This find-
ing led to bans in the wild meat trade
from Nan Shan Zhong (Guangzhou
Respiratory Disease Research
Institute) similar to the ban on eating
nervous system tissue from cows that
was implemented after new variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease emerged in
Britain. 
Ecologic changes, concomitant
with increasing contact between
humans and animal disease reservoirs,
contribute to zoonoses. The emer-
gence of SARS was facilitated by
increased contact between people and
animal disease reservoirs as the wild
meat industry expanded recently.
Global warming will likely contribute
to the spread of dengue beyond tropi-
cal regions (Tony McMichael,
National Centre for Epidemiology
and Population Health, Canberra,
Australia). Habitat fragmentation by
deforestation may increase the contact
between people and reservoir species.
For example, hemorrhagic fever virus
has been linked to deforestation in
South America. 
Containing an emerging disease
depends on rapidly designing and
implementing a control strategy
appropriate to the epidemiology of the
disease. Interdisciplinary and interna-
tional collaboration occurred with
unprecedented rapidity during the
SARS outbreak. The network of labo-
ratories in 17 countries organized by
the World Health Organization
(WHO) coordinated information shar-
ing (David Heymann, WHO) and was
instrumental in rapidly identifying the
etiologic agent of SARS (1) and in
fulfilling Koch’s postulates (2)
(Albert Osterhaus, Erasmus Uni-
versity, Rotterdam).
As is typical of an emerging dis-
ease, no vaccines or drugs to combat
SARS existed, making quarantine,
patient isolation, travel restrictions,
and contact precautions the only
means of limiting transmission.
Mathematic models provided a frame-
work for evaluating alternative con-
trol measures and making predictions
about the course of the epidemic (3,4).
Previously, similar models had guided
public health policy, for example, in
halting an outbreak of hoof and mouth
disease in the United Kingdom in
2001 (5,6). One of the complications
in setting parameters in an emerging
disease model is the difficulty in esti-
mating epidemiologic limits from the
initially small sample sizes. Thus,
openly sharing data and analysis of
key model parameters are vital. 
The model must be appropriate to
the nature of the disease and the accu-
racy of the parameter estimates (7).
Stochasticity inherent in transmission
dynamics will be particularly pro-
nounced when infection prevalence is
low. Population heterogeneity and the
network structure of human interac-
tions will affect the spread of an
emerging disease. In the 2003 SARS
outbreak, healthcare workers were at
particular risk (8) and acted as bridges
carrying the infection from the hospi-
tal and causing community wide epi-
demics. High-risk “core groups” have
been a major focus of HIV/AIDS
models for years (9), but the move-
ment of SARS patients into the core
(i.e., the hospital) adds a further com-
plication (3).  
The two waves of SARS clusters
in Toronto (Robert Maunder, Mount
Sinai Hospital, Toronto) highlight the
need for surveillance even after an
outbreak appears extinguished.
Management of the SARS epidemic
also demonstrated that public service
infrastructure, which affords the
greatest chance of success (3), is
essential to the rapid containment of
an outbreak. In areas most affected,
contact tracing was important (10). In
Guangdong, police departments
tracked down contacts of infected per-
sons, who were then followed up for
10 days after exposure. Evaluating the
surge capacity of public health servic-
es and hospitals is one way to assess
the preparedness of a medical system. 
The case-fatality rate is a key
determinant of the public health
impact of an emerging disease and
was high for SARS at approximately
15% (11). The relationship between
infectiousness and onset of symptoms
is also important. Patient isolation has
greater potential as a control strategy
if the illness can be diagnosed before
the person becomes infectious (Roy
Anderson, Imperial College London).
In contrast, persons infected with
influenza virus are highly infectious
before they become symptomatic. 
The rapidity of pathogen turnover
means that evolution in pathogen pop-
ulations can occur on a time scale that
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is epidemiologically relevant. Indeed,
SARS-CoV evolved during the course
of the SARS outbreak in China (12).
Similarly, influenza is perpetuated in
the human population by the evolu-
tion of new antigenic variants every
year (Robin Bush, University of
California, Irvine) (13). Even if the
transmissibility of an emerging dis-
ease is initially below the threshold
necessary to sustain it in a population,
the potential for the organism’s evolu-
tion to higher levels may exist
(14,15). Thus, one should not become
complacent about diseases that are
repeatedly introduced through zoono-
sis, but teeter on the edge of sustain-
ability within the human population. 
The success with which WHO
coordinated the global collaboration
in containing SARS galvanized the
World Health Assembly to grant
WHO greater authority to verify out-
breaks, conduct investigations of out-
break severity, and evaluate the ade-
quacy of control measures. The out-
come of this new authority will
depend on integrating the expertise of
public health officials, medical doc-
tors, and epidemiologists worldwide
with guidance from disease transmis-
sion models. The SARS outbreak
demonstrated that an epidemic in one
part of the world is not just an individ-
ual nation’s problem but a global
problem. 
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Conference Summary
Open Access
Publishing 
An Open Access Publishing
Conference was convened in Atlanta,
Georgia, on January 7, 2004, by the
libraries of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and
Emory University. Open Access is an
emerging publishing model for peer-
reviewed scientific research in which
authors and their publishers grant free
access to their work as long as the
authors are acknowledged and the
publisher ensures that the work is
made freely available in a digital
archive (1). The conference brought
together key stakeholders including
scientists, researchers, publishers, and
librarians and included approximately
240 participants with 80 offsite regis-
trants connecting through the simulta-
neous Web cast. 
The keynote address, “The
Coming Revolution in the Publication
of Scientific Papers,” delivered by
Harold Varmus, emphasized that 1) in
today’s Internet era, the traditional
Gutenberg print publishing model is
outdated; 2) electronic publishing has
the advantages of lower costs, global
distribution, content that can be linked
to datasets, improved archiving, and
full-text searching; and 3) rigorous
peer review is possible in electronic
and Open Access formats. Open
Access publishing challenges include
engaging professional societies in this
approach, building sustainable busi-
ness plans, and changing academic
culture so that published works are
evaluated for content rather than for
the journal label. Open Access pub-
lishing is typically financed by author
fees along with a combination of phil-
anthropic and advertising support.
Examples are the Public Library of
Science, Journal of Clinical
Investigation, and BioMed Central
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